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Processes of Spatialization
under the Global Condition

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Diana Ayeh

**Processes of Enclaving
under the Global Condition:
The Case of Burkina Faso**

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Abstract

In our project we investigate whether the current gold mining boom in Burkina Faso represents a case of enclaving. Do extractive enclaves emerge as the predominant spatial format of resource extraction in Burkina Faso vis-à-vis other spatial formats such as traditional forms of land tenure, subnational units of state administration, transregional regimes of managing resource extraction, or the nation state? If enclave formation can be observed, how does this emerging spatial format shape existing spatial orders? Is this process connected with the emergence of an “enclave democracy” or other forms of governance such as a new developmental or neo-extractivist state? Our project looks at the processes of de- and reterritorialization connected with the expansion of global capital and the emergence of nodes of resource governance in the gold mining sector. We hypothesize that the agency of stakeholders on the national and subnational levels (especially civil society organizations and local populations) in shaping these processes has increased since the 1990s. They act in varied ways, for example by mobilizing globally circulating ideas about development, resource management, and rights; by strategically networking with transnational or non-governmental organizations; or by resorting to violence on the ground. The project focuses on the consequences resulting from these actions for processes of enclaving from an anthropological perspective.

Zusammenfassung

In unserem Projekt untersuchen wir, ob der aktuelle Goldminenboom in Burkina Faso einen Fall der Enklavenbildung darstellt. Entstehen extraktive Enklaven als vorherrschendes Raumformat der Ressourcengewinnung in Burkina Faso gegenüber anderen Raumformaten, wie traditionelle Formen des Landbesitzes, subnationale Einheiten der staatlichen Verwaltung, transregionale Systeme der Ressourcengewinnung oder dem Nationalstaat? Wenn sich Enklavenbildung konstatieren lässt, stellt sich die Frage, wie das entstehende Raumformat bestehende Raumordnungen beeinflusst. Ist dieser Prozess mit dem Entstehen einer „Enklavendemokratie“ oder anderen Formen der Governance, wie ein neuer entwicklungsbezogener oder neo-extraktivistischer Staat, verbunden? Unser Projekt betrachtet Prozesse der De- und Reterritorialisierung im Zusammenhang der Ausbreitung von globalem Kapital und dem Entstehen von Steuerungsknoten der Ressourcen im Goldminensektor. Unsere Hypothese ist, dass die Einflussnahme auf diese Prozesse durch Interessenvertreter auf nationaler und subnationaler Ebene (insbesondere zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen und lokale Populationen) seit den 1990er Jahren zugenommen hat. Ihr Handeln ist vielfältig und umfasst beispielsweise die Mobilisierung von global zirkulierenden Ideen über Entwicklung, Ressourcenmanagement und Rechte, das strategische Vernetzen mit transnationalen Organisationen oder NGOs oder das Zurückgreifen auf Gewalt. Das Projekt betrachtet aus einer anthropologischen Perspektive die Folgen, die sich aus diesen Aktionen für Prozesse der Enklavenbildung ergeben.

1 Introduction

This paper outlines the research topic and approach of the project B6 “Gold Mining and New Regulations of (Sub)National Spaces in Africa” in the framework of the Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 1199: “Processes of Spatialization under the Global Condition” at the University of Leipzig. While the “spatial turn” in the social sciences and humanities emphasizes the socially constructed nature of space,¹ the global condition has been widely perceived as engendering unidirectional processes of deterritorialization.² However, despite a significant increase of transnational and transborder flows and a changing role of the nation state under the global condition, the world has become by no means “borderless”. Processes of re- and deterritorialization are rather dialectic,³ leading to new spatial formats and new spatial orders. Our project looks at such processes in the context of resource extraction in general, and more specifically at industrial gold mining in sub-Saharan Africa.

Natural resource extraction, especially large-scale industrial mining, often entails substantial spatial changes, for example the removal of entire mountains and the resettlement of populations. These changes take place in a specific socio-political environment that is influenced by global forces such as price fluctuations for commodities on the world market or policy recommendations by international financial institutions. Therefore, industrial mining areas are excellent places for the study of processes of spatialization under the global condition.

Since the 1990s, many African countries have liberalized and restructured their mining sectors under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank through the framework of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). Coupled with a rise in world market prices for gold and other precious minerals and metals, this has led to industrial and non-industrial mining booms in a number of sub-Saharan African countries.

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, the world market price for gold rose to unprecedented heights. Between 2007 and 2012, the average price of gold per troy ounce more than doubled from USD 696.77 to USD 1,668.69.⁴ Coupled with the global trend of liberalizing mining sectors, this triggered industrial and non-industrial gold mining booms in a number of sub-Saharan African countries that were not widely known before as gold producers. In other countries where multinational corporations were already active, it brought about intensified investment. The consequences have been structural changes and accelerated processes of re-spatialization in countries of the Global South such as the predominance of opencast mining in areas previously characterized by small-scale agriculture and pastoralism.

According to Harvey,⁵ global capital is constantly on the lookout for a “spatial fix”: openings for accumulation of new spaces and territories. In this regard, multinational corporations are currently looking to Africa as the “last frontier of globalization.”⁶ Included in this new frontier are gold mining areas. While the geological maps of mining sites on the websites of corporations do not represent the existing forms of settlement and land use, corporations are being confronted with varied constellations of actors and interests on the ground that shape the access to the resources at this “frontier.”⁷

In 2012, the West African country of Burkina Faso became Africa’s fourth largest gold producer after South Africa, Ghana, and Mali. Until recently, Burkina Faso’s economy was mainly characterized by cotton production for export, smallholder farming, and foreign aid dependency. Other than neighbouring Ghana and Mali, it practically had no industrial mining. Within a few years, the country has undergone significant

1 U. Engel and P. Nugent, “Introduction: The Spatial Turn in African Studies”, in: U. Engel and P. Nugent (eds.), *Respacing Africa*, Leiden: Brill, 2010, pp. 1–9.

2 K. Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State. The Rise of Regional Economies*, New York: Free Press, 1996, p. 214.

3 N. Brenner, “Beyond State-centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies”, *Theory and Society* 28 (1999) 1, pp. 39–78; M. Middell and K. Naumann, “Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization”, *Journal of Global History* 5 (2010) 1, pp. 1–22; S. Sassen, “Introduction. Locating Cities on Global Circuits”, in: S. Sassen (ed.), *Global Networks, Linked Cities*, New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 1–36.

4 B. Dowd, “Gold: The Most Precious of Metals (Part 3)”, FocusEconomics, 2016, www.focus-economics.com/blog/gold-the-most-precious-of-metals-part-3 (accessed 11 October 2016).

5 D. Harvey, “Globalization and the ‘Spatial’ Fix”, *Geographische revue* (2001) 2, p. 25.

6 N.R. Shrestha, W.I. Smith and C.L. Evans, “Africa’s Global Economic Integration and National Development: A Management Framework for Attracting FDI”, *Journal of Management Policy and Practice* 11 (2010) 5, p. 34.

7 K. Werthmann and T. Grätz, “Introduction”, in: K. Werthmann and T. Grätz (eds.), *Mining Frontiers in Africa. Anthropological and Historical Perspectives*, Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 2012.

changes towards an export-led economy. Burkina Faso has become an even more important producer of commodities for the world market during a period of domestic political transition. This has consequences on many levels, especially for the relation between the national government and local governments that have been empowered to manage natural resources on their territories through decentralization. Industrial gold mining in Burkina Faso, therefore, offers a unique opportunity to observe ongoing processes of re-spatialization under the global condition. More specifically, our project asks whether industrial gold mining leads to the emergence of extractive enclaves.

2 Extractive Enclaves and Resource Sovereignty

Ferguson postulates that the extraction of minerals and metals in Africa in the new global age is characterized by processes of “enclaving” that are modelled on offshore oil production.⁸ In the framework of “extractive neoliberalism”,⁹ this entails a weakening of sovereignty of nation states over their territories: “enclaved mineral-rich patches [are] efficiently exploited by flexible private firms, with security provided on an ‘as needed’ basis by specialized corporations while the elite cliques who are nominal holders of sovereignty certify the industry’s legality and international legitimacy in exchange for a piece of the action”.¹⁰

In our project we ask whether the current gold mining boom in Burkina Faso represents such a clear-cut case of enclaving. Do extractive enclaves emerge as the predominant spatial format of resource extraction in Burkina Faso vis-à-vis other spatial formats such as traditional forms of land tenure, subnational units of state administration, transregional regimes of managing resource extraction, or the nation state? If enclave formation can be observed, how does this emerging spatial format shape existing spatial orders? Is this process connected with the emergence of an “enclave democracy”¹¹ or other forms of governance such as a new developmental or neo-extractivist state?

Politically, an enclave is a country or a part of a country lying completely within the boundaries of another. An African example is Lesotho, which is surrounded by South Africa. An example of an exclave is the resource-rich Angolan province of Cabinda, which is separated from the rest of Angola by a narrow strip of territory belonging to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In economics and comparative development theories, especially dependency theory, the term enclave is applied to national economies where foreign firms dominate the main export sector: “An economic enclave can be defined as a physically, administratively, or legally bounded territory whose geography or morphology is intimately related to the following economic characteristics: dependence on one or a few large firms; high specialization in one activity; and weak integration into the local economy, which is used primarily to access some local factors of production.”¹² Sub-Saharan Africa has had some “classical” examples of economic enclaves, such as colonial Belgian Congo.

While combining these political and economic approaches, Ferguson’s “extractive enclaves” are pointing to the geographical concentration of resource extraction and a revenue generation that is physically confined to small areas.¹³ In a similar vein, Gudynas¹⁴ associates an “enclave economy” with a certain degree of territorial fragmentation where a particular space is more connected to globalization processes than to

8 J. Ferguson, *Global Shadows. Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2006, p. 204.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 210.

10 Writing in the same year, Auty is less sceptical about the development impact of mining enclaves. Presumably referring to Chinese firms, he stresses: “Mineral enclaves can [...] be an asset for long-term development if best practice mining firms are not displaced by rivals from emerging markets that exhibit less concern for broad-based social welfare” (R. Auty, “Mining Enclave to Economic Catalyst: Large Mineral Projects in Developing Countries”, *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 13 (2006) 1, p. 144).

11 A. Croissant and P. Thierry, “Von defekten und anderen Demokratien”, *WeltTrends* (2001) 29, pp. 9–32.

12 N.A. Phelps, M. Atienza and M. Arias, “Encore for the Enclave: The Changing Nature of the Industry Enclave with Illustrations from the Mining Industry in Chile”, *Economic Geography* 91 (2015) 2, p. 122; see also J.H. Conning and J.A. Robinson, “Enclaves and Development: An Empirical Assessment”, *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44 (2009) 4, pp. 359–385.

13 See also D.K. Leonard and S. Straus, *Africa’s Stalled Development. International Causes and Cures*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, p. 159.

14 E. Gudynas, “Der neue progressive Extraktivismus in Südamerika”, in: T. Lambert (ed.), *Der neue Extraktivismus. Eine Debatte über die Grenzen des Rohstoffmodells in Lateinamerika*, Berlin: FDCL-Verl., 2012, p. 51.

the territorial nation state. As a consequence, extractive enclaves generally do not create value chains in the country in which the resource is extracted. According to Hansen,¹⁵ “extractive FDI [foreign direct investment] in Africa has been seen as the enclave economy par excellence, moving in with fully integrated value chains, extracting resources and exporting them as commodities having virtually no linkages to the local economy”. Foreign firms import the needed infrastructure and export the resource; national elites close to the government enjoy the resource rents, but the majority of the population does not benefit from extractive activities.¹⁶ Enclaves are, however, not just models of economic phenomena but are also working and living spaces, for example oil platforms and settlements for expatriate staff. They are discursively and performatively constituted through what Appel¹⁷ calls “distancing work”. This distancing work enables expatriates who work in the oil sector to talk about rampant corruption in Equatorial Guinea as if they were not an integral element of its existence.

Referring to the metaphor of flows in globalization discourses, Ferguson¹⁸ stresses that global capital does not flow but “hops” from one securitized resource-rich enclave to another. The spaces in between enclaves are either governed by underperforming national administrations or by non-state actors, or left to themselves. In contradiction with many economists’ assumptions about a causal relation between good governance, economic growth, and development, many resource-rich countries have high growth rates in spite of evidently bad governance. While Ferguson¹⁹ mainly draws on the example of oil production in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea,²⁰ Hönke²¹ looks at mining enclaves in Katanga (DRC) as cases that illustrate the relationship between geographies of production and political topographies. She finds that these mining sites are indeed “fortresses of production”. At the same time, they surround themselves with a permeable and flexible “protection belt” in which they interact selectively with international organizations, state and community representatives, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in order to reduce risks for mining operations or damages to the companies’ reputations. Contrary to Ferguson, Hönke argues that private firms do not become completely independent of the nation state but rather that “the boundaries of the transnational field of extraction have shifted and now include INGOs [international NGOs], activists, donor agencies, and International Organisations. The result is a complex node of governance with co-existing norm systems, discourses and role models.”²² Magrin²³ adds that infrastructure erected for mining enclaves, such as roads, bridges, or telephone poles, can in fact support a disenclaving of the local economy as a side effect. This raises the question whether Ferguson’s hypothesis about enclaving is generalizable and how such “nodes of governance” are related to processes of spatialization under the global condition.

Croissant and Thiery²⁴ adopt the enclave concept for proposing a typology of “defective” democracies. They define an “enclave democracy” as a type of democracy in which “veto powers” like the military, guerrillas, or multinational corporations dominate specific political domains, which thereby move out of the reach of democratically legitimized bodies. Assuming that decision-making about the extractive sector can be one

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- 15 M.W. Hansen, “From Enclave to Linkage Economies? A Review of the Literature on Linkages Between Extractive Multinational Corporations and Local Industry in Africa”, Danish Institute for International Studies Working Paper (2014), p. 52.
- 16 A. Ackah-Baidoo, “Enclave Development and ‘Offshore Corporate Social Responsibility’: Implications for Oil-Rich Sub-Saharan Africa”, *Resources Policy* 37 (2012) 2, pp. 152–159. Based on a literature review, Hansen concludes: “there is indeed evidence suggesting that FDI in extractives does not necessarily lead to enclave economies. [...] However, it is also clear that the evidence is scattered and limited and is produced from various theoretical and methodological perspectives. Hence, generalizations are difficult to make” (ibid., p. 5).
- 17 H. Appel, “Offshore Work. Oil, Modularity, and the How of Capitalism in Equatorial Guinea”, *American Ethnologist* 39 (2012) 4, pp. 692–709.
- 18 J. Ferguson, “Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal Africa”, *American Anthropologist* 107 (2005) 3, p. 379.
- 19 Ferguson, *Global Shadows*, p. 257.
- 20 In a footnote from his article “Governing Extraction”, Ferguson acknowledges that his comparative analysis of processes of enclaving in different countries can only represent a “highly simplified sketch”. He therefore stresses the need for more detailed ethnographic accounts and case studies (ibid. p. 225–226).
- 21 J. Hönke, “Transnational Pockets of Territoriality. Governing the Security of Extraction in Katanga (DRC)”, Working Paper Series of the Graduate Centre Humanities and Social Sciences of the Research Academy Leipzig (2009), p. 28, http://home.uni-leipzig.de/~gchuman/fileadmin/media/publikationen/Working_Paper_Series/RAL_WP_2_Hoenke_web.pdf (accessed 12 September 2016).
- 22 Ibid., p. 21.
- 23 G. Magrin, *Voyage en Afrique rentière. Une lecture géographique des trajectoires du développement*, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2013, p. 424.
- 24 Croissant and Thiery, “Von defekten und anderen Demokratien”, p. 28.

of these domains, we can effectively combine the concept of “enclave democracy” with other dimensions of enclaving.

Enclave theories are bound up with the question of national sovereignty over the extraction of resources. Referring to Agnew’s²⁵ concept of “sovereignty regimes” and other approaches in political geography, Emel et al.²⁶ point out that “sovereignty [...] cannot be envisioned in terms of an exclusive actor (usually the state) exercising ‘self-determination,’ but can only be theorized in relation to the multiple social relations and political forces struggling over resources and territory”. Using the example of gold mining in Tanzania, they demonstrate that “global capital is constitutive of the process of constructing a specifically national mode of territorial sovereignty”.²⁷ The nation state and mining capital are not autonomous and antagonistic forces but are instead interdependent actors in a process that eventually leads to the emergence of “resource sovereignty [...] as a moment of struggle between state and capital over the extraction of mineral wealth”,²⁸ resulting in a “state-capital sovereignty through which sovereignty itself is made through a constellation of mutually reinforcing conditions and constraints placed upon the state by capital, and vice versa”.²⁹

Referring to the example of Argentina, Ciuffolini and de la Vega³⁰ show that large-scale extractive activities entail specific forms of representing and governing space. They propose “anchorage” (*anclaje*) and “disengagement” (*desanclaje*) as two modes of state (non-)intervention in the spaces of extractive activities. Disengagement means non-interference or decoupling of state and state territory through legislation, delegation of decision-making, privatization, or *de facto* absence, in which the state makes room for non-state actors and instances. Anchorage, on the other hand, refers to bundles of relations and interventions aimed at consolidating state presence in certain territories. These interventions include physical changes, for example construction of infrastructure, state participation in the extractive sector (e.g. creation of state-owned enterprises), and strategies of repression (e.g. through the presence of forces of law and order). Local communities have resisted these state strategies by staging protests, creating associations, or transferring their struggles to urban areas. The authors interpret these acts of resistance as processes of creating a “lived space”, which they conceptualize as a new space for the construction of the political.³¹ They postulate that local communities appropriate certain domains of knowledge and develop a new sensitivity for common goods in order to fight against *megaminería*. These new competences constitute “vectors” for expanding and strengthening local cultural practices and bring forward new forms of sociability that originate from fight and resistance. Although the authors do not substantiate these postulates by empirical observations or first-hand accounts by local actors, we can ask whether anchorage and disengagement are empirically observable in our case study in West Africa.

Taking up the hypotheses and observations outlined above, this paper aims at providing a preliminary assessment of the multiple social relations and political forces at play in the current processes of re-spatialization related to gold mining in sub-Saharan Africa. Our project looks at the processes of de- and re-territorialization connected with the expansion of global capital and the emergence of nodes of resource governance in the gold mining sector. We ask whether extractive enclaves emerge and compete with other spatial formats such as nation states, regional and transnational organizations, traditional spaces of governance, and rural municipalities. We hypothesize that the agency of actors on the national and subnational level in shaping these processes has increased in recent years. The wave of democratization in the 1990s when the “winds of change”³² blew in Africa after the end of the Cold War, the increasing access to information about events all over the globe, and possibilities to connect with people and organizations beyond the national arena via Internet as well as the “Arab Spring” that was attentively followed in sub-Saharan Africa have contributed to the growth and empowerment of civil society. Stakeholders on the national and sub-

25 J. Agnew, “Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics”, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95 (2005) 2, pp. 437–461.

26 J. Emel, M.T. Huber and M.H. Makene, “Extracting Sovereignty. Capital, Territory, and Gold Mining in Tanzania”, *Political Geography* 30 (2011) 2, pp. 70–79.

27 Ibid., p. 70.

28 Ibid., p. 73.

29 Ibid., p. 77.

30 M.A. Ciuffolini and C. de La Vega, “Konfliktivität und Territorium: Reflexionen über Bergbaukonflikte in Argentinien”, *PERIPHERIE* 33 (2013) 132, pp. 425–444.

31 Ibid., p. 439. “Wenn die Entwurzelung einen tiefgehenden Prozess der Desubjektivierung einleitet, so bildet die Konstitution eines Territoriums als Ort der Zugehörigkeit eine Gegenbewegung” (Ibid., p. 440).

32 A. Olukoshi, “Another wind of change: Will economic growth be transformative in Africa?”, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 20 June 2013, www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/money_02_olukoshi_0.pdf (accessed 10 April 2017).

national level (especially civil society organizations and local populations) act in varied ways, for example by mobilizing globally circulating ideas about development, resource management, and rights; by strategically networking with transnational or non-governmental organizations; or by resorting to violence on the ground. We will outline some of these processes below with reference to the West African country of Burkina Faso, which is one of our empirical cases, Tanzania in East Africa being the other one.

3 Mining and the Social Sciences

Ferguson and Hönke contribute to ongoing research in the social sciences concerning extractive activities in non-European countries since the 1980s.³³ A number of studies stress the negative impacts of these activities on communities living in the vicinity of mining activities. Large-scale natural resource extraction as well as artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) potentially disrupt livelihoods based on subsistence production, transforms landscapes, and bring about substantial economic and social changes in the affected regions. In some regions, large-scale mining has destroyed other natural resources and engendered violent conflicts that have escalated to secession movements and civil wars, as in the case of Bougainville, Papua New Guinea.³⁴ In some cases, such as in the Amazon region of Brazil, mining activities have led to the expulsion or decimation of local communities.³⁵ In other countries, mining is an integral part of war economies, which continues to occur in regions where warlords or other non-state actors manage resource extraction, for example in Sierra Leone or the DRC.³⁶

Anthropologists have conducted a number of studies on the transformation of collective identities, kinship, and territoriality as a consequence of industrial resource extraction. In Papua New Guinea, for example, local communities need to be categorized as “land owners” in order to be eligible for compensation payments, resettlement programmes, or employment in industrial mines. This entails a creative reinterpretation and adaptation of cosmologies and genealogies.³⁷

Mining and spatial orders in sub-Saharan Africa

In some regions of sub-Saharan Africa, the mining of metals and minerals by local populations, immigrant miners, or slaves has existed for hundreds of years. The trading of gold, for example, was an important economic basis for great precolonial empires (e.g. ancient Ghana, Mali, or Zimbabwe). There is a vast literature by archaeologists, historians, and geographers on precolonial mining and trading.³⁸ Large-scale industrial mining started in the twentieth century during the colonial period. In the former Belgian Congo as well as in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, paternalistic modes of mining capitalism emerged. These involved compa-

33 For overviews, see C. Ballard and G. Banks, “Resource Wars: The Anthropology of Mining”, *Annual Review of Anthropology* 32 (2003) 1, pp. 287–313; R. Godoy, “Mining: Anthropological Perspectives”, *Annual Review of Anthropology* 14 (1985) 1, pp. 199–217; K. Werthmann and T. Grätz, “Introduction”, in: K. Werthmann and T. Grätz (eds.), *Mining Frontiers in Africa. Anthropological and Historical Perspectives*, Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 2012, pp. 9–22.

34 G. Banks and C. Ballard (eds.), *The Ok Tedi Settlement. Issues, Outcomes, and Implications*, Canberra: National Centre for Development Studies, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1997, p. 279.

35 G. MacMillan, *At the End of the Rainbow? Gold, Land, and People in the Brazilian Amazon*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 199.

36 M.D. Beevers, “Governing Natural Resources for Peace: Lessons from Liberia and Sierra Leone”, *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 21 (2015) 2, pp. 227–246; M. Bøås, *The Politics of Conflict Economies. Miners, Merchants and Warriors in the African Borderland*, Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2015, p. 183.

37 See, for example, E. Gilberthorpe, “In the Shadow of Industry. A Study of Culturization in Papua New Guinea”, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 19 (2013) 2, pp. 261–278; A. Golub, *Leviathans at the Gold Mine. Creating Indigenous and Corporate Actors in Papua New Guinea*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2014, p. 247; D. Jorgensen, “Who and What is a Landowner? Mythology and Marking the Ground in a Papua New Guinea Mining Project”, *Anthropological Forum* 7 (1997) 4, pp. 599–627.

38 For West Africa, see E.W. Bovill, *The Golden Trade of the Moors*, London: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 293; J. Devisse, “L’Or”, in: J. Devisse (ed.), *Vallées du Niger*, Paris: Réunion des Musées Nationaux, 1993, pp. 344–358; R. Fischer, *Gold, Salz und Sklaven. Die Geschichte der grossen Sudanreiche: Gana, Mali, Songhai*, Oberdorf: Edition Piscator, 1991, p. 283.

nies and employees in a “socially thick” model of interdependent relationships that broke down in the wake of commodity busts, conflicts, and corruption in the 1980s.³⁹ The organization of industrial gold and diamond mining in South Africa was constitutive of the apartheid system with its rigid regimentation of black labour power and mobility.⁴⁰ In West Africa, Ghana is the only country with a longer history of industrial mining.⁴¹

As in colonial Ghana, industrial and non-industrial mining coexist in some African countries today. This includes knowledge transfers both between the domains and across regions. While many labourers in industrial mines were laid off in the 1980s, artisanal and small-scale mining became a livelihood option for many people even during phases when commodity prices were low.⁴² “Artisanal” mining can be anything from a seasonal occupation by rural households with simple tools to a year-round semi-mechanized operation that provides a livelihood for tens of thousands of people. The economic, legal, and political frameworks for non-industrial mining vary greatly from one country to another. Artisanal mining was and is prohibited in some countries or zones and miners can be expelled from mining sites – and deported when they are not nationals – but informal mining remains difficult to control for national and local governments. Recent mining policies that are supported by international donor agencies attempt at formalizing artisanal mining by opening up possibilities to obtain licenses or mining titles. These procedures, however, are considered too complicated or too expensive by many artisanal miners who continue to work without official recognition, which puts them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other miners and mining companies.⁴³

Historically, spatial orders in sub-Saharan Africa have always changed as a consequence of competition for the use and management of natural resources, especially land. Generally speaking, there were no individual rights to land in precolonial times. Instead, corporate groups based on kinship, such as localized lineages, held land-use rights. Assertions of being “firstcomers” who have privileged access to natural resources today are often expressed by groups who actually arrived later and drove out or merged with predecessors, or managed to attain a superior status over the original settlers. One of the reasons for these assertions is that, in the past, lineage or settlement representatives conferred land-use rights on newcomers in the area. Under colonial and postcolonial governments, state legislation and national development policies superseded customary forms of land rights and land use. However, in many countries national laws never really supplanted pre-existing forms of land tenure. Fuzzy borders, multiple and overlapping claims, and a context of legal pluralism have complicated land rights in many sub-Saharan countries. Disputes, violent conflicts, and court cases are not only about the rights per se but about which actors and institutions are entitled to make claims, settle conflicts, and decide matters.⁴⁴

The process of decentralization in a number of states in sub-Saharan Africa – instigated by international development and financial organizations from the 1990s onwards – has added a further layer of authorities, institutions, and interests to an already complex situation.⁴⁵ Elected bodies for local government have become part of the political arenas in which conditions for mining are currently negotiated. Regional and local bodies, private entrepreneurs, and artisanal miners increasingly question the national government’s authority in allocating mining rights and deciding about the revenues. Global discourses on indigeneity or

39 J. Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity. Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, p. 326; B. Rubbers, *Le Paternalisme en Question. Les Anciens Ouvriers de la Gécamines Face à la Libéralisation du Secteur Minier Katangais (RD Congo)*, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2013, p. 315.

40 J. Crush, A. Jeeves and D. Yudelman, *South Africa’s Labor Empire. A History of Black Migrancy to the Gold Mines*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, p. 266; T.D. Moodie and V. Ndatshé, *Going for Gold: Men, Mines, and Migration. Perspectives on Southern Africa*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, p. 372.

41 R.E. Dumett, *El Dorado in West Africa. The Gold-Mining Frontier, African Labor, and Colonial Capitalism in the Gold Coast, 1875–1900*, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1998, p. 396.

42 T. Hentschel, F. Hruschka and M. Priester, “Global Report on Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining. Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development”, (2002), p. 67, <http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/G00723.pdf> (accessed 14 September 2016).

43 R. Maconachie and G. Hilson, “Safeguarding Livelihoods or Exacerbating Poverty? Artisanal Mining and Formalization in West Africa”, *Natural Resources Forum* 35 (2011) 4, pp. 293–303.

44 C. Lentz, *Land, Mobility, and Belonging in West Africa. Natives and Strangers*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013, p. 348; C. Lund, “Property and Citizenship: Conceptually Connecting Land Rights and Belonging in Africa”, *Africa Spectrum* 3 (2011) 3, <http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/487/485> (accessed 29 March 2016).

45 T. Bierschenk and J.-P. Olivier de Sardan, “Powers in the Village: Rural Benin between Democratization and Decentralization”, *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 2 (2003) 73, pp. 145–173; G. Crawford and C. Hartmann (eds.), *Decentralisation in Africa: A Pathway out of Poverty and Conflict?*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008, p. 264; K. Werthmann and G. Schmitt (eds.), *Staatliche Herrschaft und kommunale Selbstverwaltung: Dezentralisierung in Kamerun*, Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel, 2008, p. 195.

environmental protection may strategically be referred to by local governments or civil society organizations in order to expand subnational claims on mining benefits.

Up until the 1990s, mining corporations and governments often did not take local populations' concerns into consideration when planning large-scale extractive activities. As a reaction to protests by communities, NGOs, lawyers, media, and a globalizing public against environmental and other damages caused by extractive activities, "responsibility" and "sustainability" became mainstreamed as common notions and features of corporate behaviour.⁴⁶ Nowadays, firms have to commit themselves to implementing measures for corporate social responsibility (CSR), such as compensation or employment for local communities. Many companies and governments have signed global agreements on social and ethical standards, for example the Global Mining Initiative (1998), the United Nations (UN) Global Compact (2000), the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (2000), or the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (2002). Invoking principles such as "accountability" and "transparency", these "good governance" and "development" frameworks also include "participation", "consultation", and "stakeholder dialogue" aimed at local governance structures and community representatives. Given that the implementation of CSR programmes always requires a minimum amount of interaction with local stakeholders in and around mining sites, our research project will investigate whether gold mining in Burkina Faso represents rather a case of social "thickness" or "thinness", the latter being constitutive for processes of enclaving.⁴⁷

4 The Probability of a Resource Curse: Looking at the Current Gold Mining Boom in Burkina Faso

The emergence of extractive enclaves can be connected to a phenomenon that economists have termed the "resource curse" or "paradox of plenty": the fact that countries remain poor, "underdeveloped", and badly governed even though – or precisely because – they are rich in natural resources. The resource curse is manifest in several phenomena: "the appreciation of exchange rates that accompanies growth in exports and undermines non-resource sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing (the so-called 'Dutch disease'); the perverse effects of windfall rents and the development of unaccountable, rentier institutions of the state".⁴⁸ Resources can also fuel violent conflicts and civil war.⁴⁹

Basedau⁵⁰ provides a more nuanced picture by stating that the resource curse is not an automatic consequence of resource endowment, but a probability. Whether or not a resource curse occurs depends on several variables that include pre-resource extraction conditions and resource-specific conditions in one particular country. He proposes looking at several dimensions in order to assess the possibility of the emergence of a resource curse and to compare cases: the general socio-economic and political country-specific

46 C. Dolan and D. Rajak, "Introduction. Toward the Anthropology of Corporate Social Responsibility", in: C. Dolan and D. Rajak (eds.), *The Anthropology of Corporate Social Responsibility*, New York: Berghahn, 2016, pp. 1–28; S. Luning, "Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) for Exploration: Consultants, Companies and Communities in Processes of Engagements", *Resources Policy* 37 (2012) 2, pp. 205–211.

47 Ferguson, *Global Shadows*, p. 257.

48 J. Phillips, E. Hailwood and A. Brooks, "Sovereignty, the 'Resource Curse' and the Limits of Good Governance. A Political Economy of Oil in Ghana", *Review of African Political Economy* 43 (2016) 147, pp. 26–27.

49 For recent assessments of the resource curse hypothesis, see M. Busse and S. Gröning, "The Resource Curse Revisited: Governance and Natural Resources", (2011), p. 30, www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2011-edia/papers/399-Busse.pdf (accessed 14 September 2016); J. Cuvelier, K. Vlassenroot and N. Olin, "Resources, Conflict and Governance: a Critical Review of the Evidence", Justice and Security Research Programme Paper (2013), p. 28, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/56351/1/JSRP_Paper9_Resources_conflict_and_governance_Cuvelier_Vlassenroot_Olin_2013.pdf (accessed 12 September 2016); Magrin, *Voyage en Afrique Rentière*, p. 424; J. Obenbrügge, "Ressourcenkonflikte in Afrika", 2009, www.wissenschaft-und-frieden.de/seite.php?artikellID=1534 (accessed 14 September 2016); P. Stevens, G. Lahn and J. Kooroshy, "The Resource Curse Revisited. Energy, Environment and Resources", (2015), p. 50, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/document/20150804ResourceCurseRevisitedStevensLahnKooroshyFinal.pdf> (accessed 14 September 2016).

50 M. Basedau, "Context Matters – Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa", Working Papers Global and Area Studies (2005), https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/wp01_basedau.pdf (accessed 24 March 2016).

conditions (e.g. relations between populations, levels, and dynamics of socio-economic development, design, and functioning of public and state institutions, behavioural patterns of elites, political parties, the military and civil society, and regional and global settings) and the resource-specific conditions (e.g. type, location, technologies of extraction, world market prices, “lootability”, etc.). We will use these criteria for summarizing the current situation in Burkina Faso and for providing indications of their possible connection to processes of enclaving.

Political conditions: In the nineteenth century, the territory that was to become Burkina Faso was inhabited by populations with different forms of socio-political organization: the highly stratified polities of Mooré-speaking populations in the centre, numerous populations in the south and the west whose structures of political authority were mostly village-based or segmentary, and Muslim polities that had emerged during the jihad phase in nineteenth-century West Africa.⁵¹ By the end of the nineteenth century, these populations came under French domination, leading to the creation of the colony of Upper Volta in 1919.⁵² In the terminology of Acemoglu et al.,⁵³ Upper Volta was an “extractive” colony in the sense that the most important resource to be extracted was manpower. In fact, the colony was dismantled in 1932 in order to facilitate forced labour migration to the neighbouring French territories in present-day Mali and Côte d’Ivoire. In 1947, the colony was re-established according to the borders of 1919 and became independent in 1960.

The most vividly remembered post-independence phase is the Sankara “revolutionary” era (1983–1987) during which the country was renamed Burkina Faso (“land of the upright people” from Mooré and Jula). Until today, Captain Thomas Sankara, who came to power after a coup, is a political ideal for many social and left-wing movements in sub-Saharan Africa due to his political vision and reforms (*auto-développement*, gender equality, disempowerment of traditional rulers, etc.⁵⁴). Sankara was killed in 1987 during a bloody coup supported by his former friend and ally Blaise Compaoré. For 27 years, Compaoré governed a presidential republic that some political scientists categorized as a “semi-authoritarian” regime.⁵⁵ He repeatedly managed to co-opt parts of the extremely fragmented and weak opposition. According to the resource curse hypothesis, resource extraction can be an inherent part of neopatrimonial systems. During Compaoré’s rulership, there were indications that the gold mining sector was informally controlled by his brother François, his wife Chantal, and some ministers and businesspeople close to the president’s family.⁵⁶ Even though these allegations are difficult to prove, such discourses or images – for example the popular notion in several countries of the president’s wife carrying gold ingots in her handbag during international flights – can be interpreted as a social commentary on enclave building.

When Compaoré intended to change the constitution in order to obtain a further mandate through presidential elections in 2015, dissatisfaction over this ambitious intention and other social and political issues among the population, the army, and even within government circles led to demonstrations, mutinies, and a breakaway of powerful politicians from the ruling party, the Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP), who formed a new party named Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès (MPP). A popular uprising in October 2014 overthrew the government of Blaise Compaoré, who fled to Côte d’Ivoire. In November 2015, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré of the MPP was elected as the new president.⁵⁷ The MPP also won the majority of seats in municipal elections in May 2016.

The government of Burkina Faso has been pursuing the decentralization of public administration since the 1990s. In 2006, the first country-wide municipal elections took place in both urban and rural local governments. The municipality (*commune*) is the basic unit of local government, of which there are three types:

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- 51 G. Savonnet, “Le paysan gan et l’archéologie ou inventaire partiel des ruines de pierres du pays lobi-gan (Burkina et Côte d’Ivoire)”, *Cahiers des Sciences Humaines* 1 (1986) 22, pp. 57–82.
- 52 J.-M. Kambou-Ferrand, *Peuples voltaïques et conquête coloniale, 1885–1914. Burkina Faso*, Paris: L’Harmattan, 1993, p. 480.
- 53 D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson and J.A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”, *The American Economic Review* 91 (2001) 5, pp. 1369–1401.
- 54 B. Jaffré, *Biographie de Thomas Sankara. La Patrie ou la Mort...*, Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997, p. 267.
- 55 J. Mazzocchetti and M. Hilgers (eds.), *Révoltes et oppositions dans un régime semi-autoritaire. Le cas du Burkina Faso*, Paris: Karthala, 2010, p. 313.
- 56 Oxford Policy Management, “Political Economy Analysis of the Mining Sector in Burkina Faso”, 2011, www.opml.co.uk/projects/political-economy-analysis-mining-sector-burkina-faso (accessed 9 May 2016); J.A. Traoré, “Secteur Minier Burkinabé”, *Le Reporter*, www.reporterbf.net/index.php/diagnostic/item/110-secteur-minier-burkinabe (accessed 13 October 2016).
- 57 S. Hagberg, “The Legacy of Revolution and Resistance in Burkina Faso”, *International Peace Research Institute*, 2016, <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2016/legacy-revolution-and-resistance-burkina-faso> (accessed 14 September 2016).

302 rural communes, 47 ordinary urban status communes, and 2 special status urban communes (Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso). Each commune has a municipal council directly elected by universal suffrage and a mayor indirectly elected by the municipal council. Nevertheless, administrative authorities nominated by the government such as district heads and high commissioners as well as “traditional” authorities continue to exert some influence at the local government level. Rural municipalities were only created in 2006, so they did not figure in the then valid mining code from 2003. Today, mayors and municipal councillors aim at exercising authority over mining activities as well as the proceeds from mining on the territories of rural municipalities, thereby challenging the authority of the nation state and foreign mining corporations. One question is whether this competition surrounding decision-making over spaces and resources can prevent or stimulate the emergence of extractive enclaves.

Socio-economic conditions: Burkina Faso is a land-locked West African country in the ecologically fragile Sahel zone. More than 80 per cent of its population relies on subsistence farming and some cash crop production, especially cotton. Cotton and gold represented 85 per cent of all exports in 2015.⁵⁸ Urban livelihoods are mostly pursued in the informal sector. Burkina Faso usually ranks low in the Human Development Index (2016: 185/188), but some progress has been made in reaching the Millennium Development Goals, for example in education, the fight against HIV/AIDS, better access to clean water, private sector development, and the reduction of corruption.⁵⁹ Burkina Faso’s economy is highly dependent on cotton exports, external aid, and remittances. Development experts regard Burkina Faso as a “donor darling” that has largely followed recommendations by multilateral donor organizations since the end of the Sankara government. The recent extractive activities seem to collide with established approaches to economic development in this predominantly rural country. In some cases, they threaten to literally undermine areas that have received large amounts of international development aid since the 1970s, for example the perimeters of the agricultural and resettlement scheme Aménagement des Vallées des Voltas (AVV). Do extractive enclaves replace agricultural livelihoods? What are the consequences for smallholder farmers, cotton production, or relationships with the donor community?

Country- and resource-specific conditions: Gold deposits are dispersed throughout the country. Burkina Faso accounts for 21 per cent of the total West Africa Birrimian mineral province, a world-class gold deposit province. The so-called greenstone belts contain all of the major deposits in Ghana and continue northward into Burkina Faso. Gold reserves are estimated at more than 800 tons.⁶⁰ The geological setting in Burkina Faso is similar to the gold belts of eastern Canada, explaining the current interest by Canadian firms in the country, which have the required experiences to mine such deposits.

Prior to the colonial period, there was gold mining in some areas along the Mouhoun (Black Volta), but due to insufficient data we know only little about how, by whom, and under what socio-political circumstances gold mining and trade were organized before the present-day populations moved into these regions since the eighteenth century.⁶¹ Artisanal gold mining restarted in the 1980s during a drought in the West African Sahel and Savanna. Positioning the state as the sole owner of land, the Sankara government (1983–1987) established a monopoly on producing and marketing gold through the Comptoir Burkinabè des Métaux Précieux (CBMP).⁶² The CBMP not only ensured the state’s predominance in gold trade and export, its local

58 African Development Bank (AfDB), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “African Economic Outlook 2016. Sustainable Cities and Structural Transformation”, African Economic Outlook (2016), p. 349, www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/AEO_2016_Report_Full_English.pdf (accessed 14 September 2016).

59 Ibid; AfDB, OECD and UNDP, “African Economic Outlook 2015. Regional Development and Spatial Inclusion”, African Economic Outlook (2015), p. 351 www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/sites/default/files/content-pdf/AEO2015_EN.pdf (accessed 14 September 2016).

60 Natural Resource Governance Institute, “Burkina Faso”, www.resourcegovernance.org/our-work/country/burkina-faso (accessed 13 October 2016).

61 J.-B. Kiéthéga, *L’or de la Volta Noire. Archéologie et histoire de l’exploitation traditionnelle*, Paris: Karthala, 1983, p. 247; K. Schneider, “Das Gold der Lobi - Aspekte Historischer und Ethnologischer Interpretation”, *Paideuma* 36 (1990), pp. 277–290; K. Werthmann, “Gold Mining and Jula Influence in Precolonial Southern Burkina Faso”, *The Journal of African History* 48 (2007) 3, pp. 395–414.

62 M. Côte, “What’s in a Right? The Liberalisation of Gold Mining and Decentralisation in Burkina Faso”, Land Deal Politics Initiative

agents also had a security function in local mining sites and were involved in the mediation of conflicts.⁶³ The artisanal gold mining boom in the 1980s coincided with a high price for gold on the world market (USD 850/oz in January 1980), but even after a dramatic drop in 1999 to USD 250, artisanal mining continued.

In the years following the assassination of Thomas Sankara in 1987, and the takeover by Blaise Compaoré, the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programmes under the auspices of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund led to a series of liberalization and democratic decentralization programmes in the country. The first national mining code of 1993, revised in 1997 and 2003, favoured private companies and foreign investment, encouraging the evolution of an industrial sector as a “motor of growth”.⁶⁴ The gradual liberalization of the gold trade in the late 1990s was followed by a privatization of the CBMP and finally its liquidation in 2006. Since then, private Burkinabe and foreign companies have been purchasing gold from artisanal mines. According to recent estimates, circa 1 million people (out of a total of 17 million) throughout the country depend directly or indirectly on artisanal gold mining activities.⁶⁵

Some authors argue that Structural Adjustment Programmes since the 1980s caused the expansion of artisanal and small-scale mining in sub-Saharan Africa because they led to unemployment, which prompted the jobless and poor to pursue other subsistence means.⁶⁶ In Burkina Faso, however, the formal sector is relatively unimportant. Only 5 per cent of all workers receive regular salaries in the formal sector.⁶⁷ Artisanal mining in Burkina Faso instead provides alternatives to other kinds of informal occupation and to labour migration, for example to industrial mines or plantations in neighbouring Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.

Until recently, there was no industrial gold mining in Burkina Faso, with one exception. In 1938, the colonial government established an industrial gold mine in Poura. The mine remained rather unproductive up to the end of the Second World War.⁶⁸ It was closed in 1966, reopened in 1984, and closed again after the collapse of a shaft in 1989. Just after its restoration, the mine was closed again in 1999 when the world market gold price dropped to USD 250/oz. The national enterprise Société de Recherches et d’Exploitation Minières du Burkina (SOREMIB), which ran the mine together with the Canadian firm Sahelian Goldfields, was liquidated and more than 300 workers were laid off. At about the same time, the semi-industrial mine of Essakane in the northeast of the country was closed in the wake of a corruption scandal and 230 workers were sacked.

The current industrial gold mining boom is partly an effect of a liberalization of the mining sector following recommendations by international donor agencies such as the IMF and World Bank. In 2003, the government of Burkina Faso changed the national mining code in order to make conditions more favourable for foreign mining companies. The new mining code in fact soon attracted more than 30 companies that undertook exploration. In the aftermath of the credit crunch in 2008, gold once again became an important world market item. Gold mining companies that had held exploration permits in Burkina Faso but that had been inactive due to the low world market price now started constructing industrial mining facilities. Between 2008 and 2009, gold production in Burkina Faso more than doubled from 5,000 kg to 11,000 kg and gold became the major export product, outranking cotton. The world market price for gold rose spectacularly to approximately USD 1,890/oz in 2011. However, the annual economic growth rate between 2008 and 2011 remained almost the same (5.5 per cent compared to 5.4 per cent in the period between 2000 and 2007).⁶⁹

Working Paper (2013), www.plaas.org.za/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/LDPIWP25cote.pdf (accessed 29 March 2016); S. Luning, “Liberalisation of the Gold Mining Sector in Burkina Faso”, *Review of African Political Economy* 35 (2008) 117, pp. 387–401; K. Werthmann, “Gold Mining in Burkina Faso since the 1980s”, in: K. Werthmann and T. Grätz (eds.), *Mining Frontiers in Africa. Anthropological and Historical Perspectives*, Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 2012, pp. 119–132.

- 63 Côte, “What’s in a Right?”, p. 5; Werthmann, *Bitteres Gold*, p. 58.
- 64 National Transitional Council, “Loi N° 031-2003 portant Code Minier au Burkina Faso. Code Minier 2003, Burkina Faso Ivoire République”, 2003, www.eisourcebook.org/cms/Burkina%20Faso%20Mining%20Act%202003.pdf (accessed 2 January 2017); Côte, “What’s in a Right?”, p. 1; Luning, “Liberalisation of the Gold Mining Sector in Burkina Faso”.
- 65 L. Arnaldi Di Balme and C. Lanzano, “Gouverner l’éphémère. Etude sur les sites d’orpaillage de Bantara (Commune de Kampti) et Gombélédogou (Commune de Koumbia), Burkina Faso”, *Etude Recit* 37 (2014), p. 14.
- 66 S.M. Banchirigah, “How Have Reforms Fuelled the Expansion of Artisanal Mining? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa”, *Resources Policy* 31 (2006) 3, pp. 165–171; G. Hilson and C. Potter, “Structural Adjustment and Subsistence Industry. Artisanal Gold Mining in Ghana”, *Development and Change* 36 (2005) 1, pp. 103–131; N. Yakovleva, “Perspectives on Female Participation in Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining. A Case Study of Birim North District of Ghana”, *Resources Policy* 32 (2007) 1–2, pp. 29–41.
- 67 T. Dayo et al., “Burkina Faso 2016”, *African Economic Outlook*, 2016, www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/country-notes/burkina-faso (accessed 13 October 2016).
- 68 M. Moussa, “L’or des régions de Poura et de Gaoua. Les vicissitudes de l’exploitation coloniale, 1925–1960”, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 28 (1995) 3, pp. 563–576.
- 69 Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO), “Étude monographique sur le secteur de l’or dans l’UMEOA”, Working Paper (February 2013), p. 6, www.bceao.int/Etude-monographique-sur-le-secteur.html (accessed 15 March 2016).

In 2012, Burkina Faso became the fourth gold producer in sub-Saharan Africa after South Africa, Ghana, and Mali, overtaking Tanzania. Until 2016, Australian, British, Canadian, Russian, and South African corporations opened ten industrial mines in Burkina Faso. Furthermore, exploration permits, which are mainly held by junior companies, are currently covering a large part of the national territory.

Regional and international conditions: Both industrial and non-industrial mining are increasingly regulated through global policies, institutions, and initiatives such as the World Bank, UN organizations, or the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The EITI was launched by Tony Blair in 2002 at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg and formally founded at a conference in London in 2003. Since 2009, the EITI has been a registered non-profit association in Norway. In countries that become “candidate” and “compliant” members, government, mining companies, and civil society organizations agree on mechanisms that ensure transparency and publication of payments by extractive companies. Burkina Faso signed up for membership in the EITI in 2008, gained candidate status in 2009, and has been a compliant member since 2013. The country seems to have signed up for membership under some pressure by international donors on the government to enhance transparency in the mining sector.⁷⁰ However, the role and influence of civil society organizations in this framework remained extremely limited under the Compaoré regime. There was only one NGO concerned with mining issues before Burkina Faso became involved with the EITI: the Organisation pour le renforcement des capacités de développement (Organization for Strengthening Capacities for Development, ORCADE). ORCADE organized, among other things, a two-day workshop in January 2010 to explain to and discuss with the public the directive on mining by the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS). Only two other NGOs were founded after the EITI process had started: MinAlert and Publiez Ce Que Vous Payez (PCQVP). In addition to the weak role of civil society, the government’s involvement remained visible owing to the fact that the secretary general of the national EITI secretariat from 2008 to 2015 was a former minister. During this time, the process of reporting payments from mining companies to the government was delayed. A political economy analysis for the World Bank states that the government’s “objectives with regard to the mining industry do not appear to go beyond maximizing fiscal revenue. Developmental objectives, including the possibilities of building stronger linkages between the mining sector and other economic activities, supporting employment generation in mining communities and increasing local content, play a subordinate role.”⁷¹ Even after the political transition, issues remain in regards to the transparency of the mining sector.⁷²

Since 1975 and 1994, respectively, Burkina Faso has been a member state of the regional organizations the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). These organizations have recently reformed their guidelines for national mining codes in order to create a more coherent policy vis-à-vis multinational corporations. In addition, Burkina Faso is a member of the Africa Mining Vision (2009) of the African Union. At the regional level, Oxfam America (West Africa Regional Office) is the leading international non-governmental organization in the mining sector. It facilitated the participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) in the drafting of the ECOWAS regional mining code.

On 26 June 2015, the transitional government of Burkina Faso approved a new mining code that was implemented on 16 July 2015. “New items in the 2015 Mining Code include, amongst others, the introduction of a new tax of 1 per cent of the gross revenues to support a Mining Fund for Local Development (which was created at the request of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (‘WB’) as a condition for future financial support of the country by the WB), the removal of the 10 per cent reduction in income tax rates for the mining sector, penalties for changes in production levels, the obligation for a mining company to pay a dividend if an after-tax profit is made and adequate reserves have been accumulated, and for feasibility studies to include a plan for the training and the promotion of local mining executives.”⁷³ However, the introduction of the new mining code remains a highly debated issue. Shortly before the adoption of the code

70 L. Arnaldi Di Balme, P. Hochet and M. Kevane, “Mining, Transparency, and Civil Society in Burkina Faso. Issues and Recommendations”, unpublished report (2011), p. 9.

71 Oxford Policy Management, “Political Economy Analysis of the Mining Sector in Burkina Faso”, p. 13.

72 “En effet, les recettes collectées par l’État sur l’activité d’extraction ont représenté seulement 2.4 % du PIB en 2015, ce qui semble sous-estimé” (T. Dayo et al., “Burkina Faso 2016”, p. 10). To a member of the national EITI committee who represents the BCEAO, it is clear that firms do not provide the real amount of payments (personal communication, February 2016).

73 Orezone, “Overview”, www.orezone.com/projects/overview (accessed 13 October 2016).

by the National Assembly, the mining companies' association *Chambre des mines du Burkina* publicly expressed concerns about a potential withdrawal of FDI from the country and a premature end of the "mining boom" in Burkina Faso.⁷⁴

Concerning the possibility of a resource curse, Burkina Faso is a country where the civil society, the political opposition to the Compaoré regime, and the new government have recently demonstrated their capability to sustain peaceful protest, manage a transitional phase and conduct democratic elections. Media and NGOs are closely following the development of the mining sector and do not hesitate to publicly voice concerns and criticism. The transitional government adopted a new mining code and the chairman of the national EITI committee has been replaced. While these processes seem to reduce the probability of a resource curse, the new government largely consists of members from the previous government. Therefore, the continued existence of informal ways of managing the mining sector cannot be excluded. Nevertheless, local governments and populations are no longer prepared to accept mining activities on their territories unconditionally or uncritically.

With regard to processes of enclaving, this brief overview has highlighted the multiplicity of actors and scales involved in the production of spatial formats in the context of extractive activities. While Basedau (2005) and other authors of the literature concerning the resource curse refer to spatial aspects such as the type, location, or "lootability" of resources, there has been no systematic exploration of the relation between the resource curse and the emergence of extractive enclaves. Our project therefore enquires into the respective "disadvantages" and "advantages" of the enclave as a spatial format with regard to the possibility of a resource curse. Does the extractive enclave, for example, reinforce the "lootability" of resources by a small rentier state elite? Or can it otherwise serve as a vantage point for mobilizing civil society movements on local, national, and international scales?

5 Actors and spaces

Until recently, people in Burkina Faso used the term "enclave" mainly to describe the land-locked position of Burkina Faso. *Désenclavement* (opening up) has been a goal of development policies in the country for a long time. Today, the term enclave is applied to mining sites. In 2012, Luc Adolphe Tiao, prime minister at that time, attended an opening ceremony for the mine of Essakane, which is run by the IAMGOLD corporation. In his speech, he said: "Essakane should not be a kind of enclave in an ocean of misery".⁷⁵ A representative of a union stated: "The mines resemble enclaves, it is like a state within the state".⁷⁶ These examples show that enclaves have in fact emerged in Burkina Faso, at least on a discursive level. In such discourses, the extractive enclave appears as a space of exploitation. Chouli,⁷⁷ who conducted interviews in several mining regions of Burkina Faso, documents statements about labourers who were forced to work overtime without remuneration, or villagers who were relocated without compensation. Communities affected by mining activities as well as labourers and local authorities seemed to feel alienated by the way the former government tolerated or supported mining companies even when these breached national laws. In some cases, such discourses were translated into action, for example when local discontent culminated in attacks against mining companies' infrastructures.

During the phase of increasing unrest that preceded the uprising in 2014, industrial mining companies in Burkina Faso experienced protests and acts of vandalism. A prolonged strike started at the Kalsaka mine (province of Yatenga) in May 2011. Local employees complained about the pronounced differences between

74 N. Coulibaly, "Aboubakar Sidikou : 'Le nouveau Code minier burkinabè tombe au mauvais moment'", www.jeuneafrique.com/242493/economie/aboubakar-sidikou-le-nouveau-code-minier-burkinabe-tombe-au-mauvais-moment/ (accessed 13 October 2016).

75 L. Chouli, *Le boom minier au Burkina Faso. Témoignages de victimes de l'exploitation minière*, Pantin: Fondation Gabriel Péri, 2014, p. 39.

76 Ibid., p. 75.

77 Ibid.

their salaries and the salaries of Ghanaian employees.⁷⁸ In September 2011, the mining compound of PINSA-PO Gold in the province of Passoré was attacked. Vehicles were burned and mining equipment was carried away (although it was later returned at the request of the traditional authorities). Allegedly, these attacks were a consequence of the mine's failure to honour the agreement with the village Pelegtenga to construct infrastructure, employ local people, and protect the environment. The mine officials, on the other hand, saw this attack as staged by unnamed "outside" forces. In November 2011, the NGO ORCADE publicized the fact that a police detective superintendent was withdrawn from his post at Essakane by the government at the instigation of the Canadian firm IAMGOLD because he seemed to be "too close to the local population".⁷⁹

Protests became more widespread during and after the uprising. In December 2014, for instance, a strike took place at the Inata gold mine, which is owned and operated by the London-based Avocet Mining PLC. Some months later, the subsequent firing of employees without giving notice or paying damages was an issue in court cases.⁸⁰

The Karma case

An interesting case that clearly illustrates a collision of different spatial orders happened in the province of Yatenga. Here, the Canadian junior company True Gold Mining Inc., based in Vancouver, received an exploitation permit in January 2014 to develop and operate the Karma gold mine, its first project. The permit was issued to Riverstone Karma SA, the company's Burkina Faso operating subsidiary, which was 10 per cent owned by the government of Burkina Faso. Previously, artisanal gold diggers had been present in the area and had sold their gold to the CBMP and later to the private company Société Minière Kindo Adama (SOMIKA).

The project borders the district of Namissiguima, which includes the Muslim settlement of Ramatoulaye. Ramatoulaye is a special case in the history of Islam in West Africa, more specifically of the Hamalliyya (or Hamawiyya) branch of the Tijani order founded by Cheick Hamallah in Niore, Mali.⁸¹ Ramatoulaye was founded in 1917 by Cheick Hamallah's disciple Boubakar Sawadogo. His son and successor Sidi Mohammed introduced the celebration of the Prophet's birthday (*mouloud*) to the inhabitants of Ramatoulaye in 1952. The present Cheick Aboubacar Maïga II is a grandson of the founder. Today, the mosque of Ramatoulaye and the annual celebration of the Prophet's birthday attract thousands of pilgrims from Burkina Faso and the neighbouring countries to the "Holy City" and constitute an important source of prestige and income for the Cheick, his family, and the entire settlement.⁸²

On 14 January 2015, True Gold Mining announced that it "temporarily suspended" its activities following violent demonstrations during which inhabitants of Namissiguima and neighbouring villages had violently attacked the facilities of the Karma mine, destroying some of the company's infrastructure and equipment and causing about USD 6.1 million in damages. The reason given by the protesters was the alleged potential damage to the Ramatoulaye mosque.⁸³ It was rumoured that a gold vein was located right underneath the mosque and it would lead to the destruction of the mosque and the relocation of the entire village, a rumour that was unfounded according to Emmanuel Nonyarma (Secrétaire Général du Ministère des Mines et de l'Énergie).⁸⁴ Representatives of the Muslim community said that the Cheick of Ramatoulaye should have

78 A first strike over salaries in the Kalsaka mine had already taken place in 2009. M. Thune, "L'industrialisation de l'exploitation de l'or à Kalsaka, Burkina Faso: une chance pour une population rurale pauvre?", *EchoGéo* 17 (2011), p. 13.

79 H. Baro, "ROGNE SUR LES SITES MINIERES: ORCADE Tire la Sonnette d'Alarme", 2011, <http://lefaso.net/spip.php?article44795> (accessed 13 October 2016).

80 P. Bax and S. Gongo, "Revolt Rocks Burkina Faso's Mines After President Flees", 2015, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-08/revolt-rocks-burkina-faso-s-mines-after-president-compaore-flees (accessed 4 June 2016).

81 B.F. Soares, *Islam and the Prayer Economy. History and Authority in a Malian Town*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005, p. 306.

82 F. Dassetto, P.-J. Laurent and T. Ouédraogo, *Un islam confrérique au Burkina Faso. Actualité et mémoire d'une branche de la Tijâniyya*, Paris: Karthala, 2012, p. 276.

83 According to True Gold, the incident was caused by "a small handful of unruly artisanal [sic] miners" (True Gold Mining, "Karma CSR", www.truegoldmining.com/our-projects/karma#field-project-tab-tab-1 (accessed 13 October 2016)).

84 O.L. Ouédraogo, "Destruction des installations de True Gold : Il n'y aura pas d'exploitation sous la mosquée de Ramatoulaye", 2015, <http://lefaso.net/spip.php?article62879> (accessed 13 October 2016).

been consulted during the negotiation of the agreement between the government and True Gold Mining. They therefore requested a review of the agreement.⁸⁵

Protests against mining activities had already begun in November 2014.⁸⁶ The fact that these incidents happened around and after the uprising against the Compaoré regime suggests that the local populations now felt empowered to speak out and act against what they perceived as collusion between the old regime and foreign mining companies. This interpretation is supported by the fact that protesters also targeted infrastructure constructed by the mayor of Namissiguima during further protests on 16 January 2015.⁸⁷ In fact, protesters against True Gold Mining warned government representatives that the case of Ramatoulaye was “like article 37 of the constitution”,⁸⁸ this being the article that Blaise Compaoré had attempted to change in order to obtain a further mandate, which ultimately caused the uprising that ended his regime.

During several rounds of negotiation, government representatives and True Gold Mining assured the Cheick of Ramatoulaye and the population that the mosque would not be affected by mining activities. On 16 May 2015, the government finally authorized True Gold Mining to resume its activities.⁸⁹ On 15 June 2015, representatives of Riverstone Karma SA (True Gold Mining’s Burkina Faso subsidiary), the Ministry of Mining, the Ministry of Territorial Administration, and the Cheick of Ramatoulaye signed an agreement in Ouagadougou.⁹⁰ A *Comité de Suivi et de Liaison* (CSL) with 80 members – representing 36 settlements, traditional authorities, religious leaders, as well as women and youth and development associations – was set up on 27 June 2015.⁹¹ For True Gold Mining, the consequences of these events were disastrous. Although the damage was partly covered by insurance and gold production could have continued profitably, the incidents shattered investors’ trust. On 26 April 2016, Endeavour Mining acquired True Gold Mining.⁹²

The conflict involving the Karma project clearly shows that local communities can challenge the government and mining companies in the struggle about spatial formats and orders. For the Muslim community of Ramatoulaye, the status of the settlement as a place of pilgrimage had precedence over any other activities, including mining. They were most concerned with preserving the special religious status of the village. Even though its own intentions remain largely unknown to the public, True Gold Mining was obviously not able to establish an enclave-type extraction site as the neighbouring population was in constant opposition to their work. The company was even unable to secure its concession in spatial terms. Artisanal miners and other stakeholders managed to enter and to partly destroy their construction sites. However, the case also demonstrates internal differences among local actors. Some inhabitants and religious authorities of Ramatoulaye were opposed to any mining activities and demanded that the operations stop altogether. Others called for a more transparent agreement between the company, the government, and local communities and asked for employment of local youth and construction of infrastructure. In Burkina Faso, incidents such as the Karma case are increasingly documented and discussed in the media. In the 1990s, the Burkinabe public knew little about mining activities. Now there is a growing awareness of both artisanal and industrial mining and concerns about their consequences for environment, health, and social well-being.

To be sure, corporations, states, governments, local communities, and other actors are not monolithic entities. They are internally differentiated and comprise individuals and subgroups with different interests and power resources.⁹³ The involvement of a range of new actors, such as coalitions of (inter)national NGOs,

85 Bax and Gongo, “Revolt Rocks Burkina Faso’s Mines After President Flees”.

86 Y. Nikiema, “Exploitation de la mine de Karma au Yatenga : Les acteurs ont mis en place un comité de liaison et de suivi”, 2015, <http://lefaso.net/spip.php?article65533> (accessed 13 October 2016).

87 Ouédraogo, “Destruction des Installations de True Gold”.

88 Y. Nikiema, “Mines : Des installations et des gros Engins de la société True Gold incendiés par les populations”, 2015, <http://lefaso.net/spip.php?article62789> (accessed 13 October 2016).

89 B. Ba, “Mine de KARMA : TRUE GOLD MINING autorisée à reprendre ses activités”, 2015, <http://lefaso.net/spip.php?article64744> (accessed 13 October 2016).

90 G.B. Bazié, “Riverstone Karma SA : Un accord tripartite pour une exploitation apaisée de la mine”, 2015, <http://lefaso.net/spip.php?article65291> (accessed 13 October 2016).

91 M. Diallo, “Projet minier Riverstone Karma SA : Un comité de suivi et de liaison communautaire pour prévenir toute crise”, 2015, <http://lefaso.net/spip.php?article66440> (accessed 13 October 2016); Nikiema, “Exploitation de la mine de Karma au Yatenga”.

92 True Gold Mining, “Endeavour Completes Acquisition of True Gold”, 2016, www.truegoldmining.com/news/endeavour-completes-acquisition-true-gold (accessed 13 October 2016).

93 T. Niederberger and T. Haller, “PART I: 1. Introduction”, in: T. Niederberger et al. (eds.), *Open cut. Mining, Transnational Corporations and Local Populations*, Münster: Lit Verlag, 2013, pp. 15–34; D. Rajak, “Ethnographies of Extraction: Anthropology, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Resource Curse”, *Suomen Antropologi* (2010) 1, pp. 91–94.

media, and lawyers further leads to a “multi-sited and multi-vocal arena for interaction”.⁹⁴ This research project intends to shed some light on existing power (im)balances and contesting claims within those arenas.

6 Research questions

Our project aims at responding to two central questions of the Collaborative Research Centre 1199: (1) Which spatial formats become relevant through the social actions of individuals or groups when reacting to the global condition and (2) which spatial orders emerge out of overlapping and competing spatial formats? We specifically ask whether a process of enclaving takes place in the mining sector of Burkina Faso or whether other spatial formats become prevalent in the course of resource extraction and its governance. Empirically, we look at these processes on the level of regional organizations, nation states, and local governments. We explore the “nodes of governance” that emerge as a consequence of the encounter of various interest groups in the context of extractive activities.

Given that spatialization is both a process and outcome of social action in various ways, “enclaving” is not limited to the mere physical demarcation of space in the course of politico-economic projects and processes. Therefore, this research project also focuses on their social making as an “imagined space”. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in the vicinity of industrial mining projects in Burkina Faso, we will analyse how the concession border is socially constructed. In order to detect “the social and cognitive processes which form social, symbolic and imagined spaces”,⁹⁵ the research project draws on two assumptions about the spatial format “enclave” and the agency of local actors.

1. The rise of industrial gold mining in Burkina Faso leads to some form of “enclaving”

As outlined above, the growing demand for extractive resources leads various stakeholders to engage with new spatial formats. Although not a “weak state” that is affected by permanent social unrest, corruption, or even “raging civil wars”, the mineral abundance of Burkina Faso does not always benefit the wider society. As the main export product is mainly controlled by foreign companies, at least some form of enclaving is taking place at the level of the national economy. Is this emerging spatial format a sign of an imminent resource curse? A much-debated question about globalization is whether processes such as enclaving lead to a weakening of national sovereignty. While the appearance of multinational corporations in a country like Burkina Faso has certainly complicated the negotiation of mining rights, the regulatory force of governmental bodies might not necessarily be weakened. Recent political and social developments, such as the regime change and the introduction of the new mining code in 2015, may rather be interpreted as an attempt by the state to regain authority and control over large-scale gold mining, as is EITI membership and other initiatives in regional frameworks. Moreover, local communities are not automatically excluded from shaping enclaving processes, which leads us to the second assumption.

2. The agency of national and local actors to shape processes of spatialization and regulate the globally organized capital has increased

Globalization has facilitated new forms of communication technologies and forms of interaction that are surpassing local and national territorial boundaries. Local actors’ access to globally circulating ideas concerning “development”, resource management, and rights, as well as their capacity to strategically link up with transnational or non-governmental organizations, has increased. In addition, violence may become an option for local communities in dealing with multinational corporations. In Burkina Faso, the institutional vacuum

94 Ballard and Banks, “Resource Wars”, p. 289.

95 U. Engel and P. Nugent, “Introduction: The Spatial Turn in African Studies”, in: U. Engel and P. Nugent (eds.), *Respacing Africa*, Leiden: Brill, 2010, p. 4.

caused by the recent regime change appeared to be a suitable moment for protests against industrial mines. However, violence constitutes only one extreme form of resistance to the perceived disempowerment in this given spatial order. We will therefore investigate emerging or already existing spatial formats in mining areas and ask how relations of access and rights to extraction play out on the ground. The expression of re- and deterritorialization by social, symbolic, and physical means will be analysed in resorting to what Ballard and Banks⁹⁶ call the “triad stakeholder model”. Placing company, state, and community actors at the centre of investigation, we will also examine the internal complexity of “entities” and the interactions of “old” and “new” actors (such as national and international NGOs, and the media).


With regard to Burkina Faso as a nation state, we ask whether central government authority becomes rescaled on the local level. Are municipalities and other local governance bodies implementing national policies at the local level, or are they rather acting as brokers of the multinational mining corporations in order to (re)gain authority and access to resources? What are the influences of the national mining code and supranational policy instruments on local processes of spatialization? State authority makes reference to three separate, though intertwined spatial formats: new regionalisms (e.g. AU, ECOWAS), nation state, and municipalities. To date, it is not clear whether these spatial formats have the capacity to complement one another and how they are challenged by competing power relations on the ground. How does the new mining code conceptualize these relations? Does the government confirm or withdraw regulatory authority that it delegated to the rural municipalities? Does it change their territorial boundaries in order to limit claims to compensation by mining companies?

Lastly, we will look at the economic, political, and social consequences for the affected communities. What are the effects of processes of spatialization such as enclaving for local livelihoods, power structures, and social cohesion? How do community members position themselves when it comes to the (re)negotiation of rights to natural resources? How are notions and perceptions of autochthony and landownership intersecting with claims to resources, and how are they shaped by the presence of multinational mining companies? To what local and trans-local norms are actors referring to when they are making claims? What kinds of relations emerge between local populations and government, municipal authorities, corporations, NGOs, and other formal or informal power holders?

In order to analyse these issues in a comparative framework, one project team member (Kai Roder) will conduct empirical case studies in Tanzania. Both Burkina Faso and Tanzania are newcomers among the top gold producers. As in Burkina Faso, most gold mining in Tanzania was predominantly non-industrial until the 1990s. In both countries, the entry of corporate foreign mining interests has generated considerable debate regarding processes of economic liberalization and privatization as well as the role of foreign investment. The comparison between West and East Africa facilitates the identification of trends in the spatial organization of large-scale industrial mining.

We will also compare our empirical findings with social science studies about large-scale gold mining in other parts of the world, for example Latin America or the Asia-Pacific region. The comparison serves to analyse whether the specific constellations of spatial orders, formats, and actors exhibit significant differences that highlight the diversity of processes of spatialization under the global condition.

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